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1 Introduction 
Equity in health and health care distribution is a primary concern for welfare states. In 
countries that have adopted universal health care coverage, health care is considered a social 
service that ought to be distributed according to need; not based on the ability to pay or other 
socioeconomic characteristics.  
To measure and examine inequity, it is important to distinguish between need and non-need 
factors that determine health care utilization. In the empirical analysis of this paper, variables 
that measure health status, age, gender and lifestyle are categorized as need factors. The 
socio-economic and other factors such as income, education, regional variation, occupation, 
civil status and place of origin are categorized as non-need. This categorization is a subjective 
value judgment. Variation in health care use due to need variables can be taken as legitimate. 
If the use of health care varies with the non-need variables significantly, controlling for 
differences in need, it shows that there is inequity in the utilization of health care. These are 
unfair inequalities because they are caused by the factors beyond the sphere of individual 
responsibility or characteristics (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009). 
Conceptually, equity can be divided into horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity 
exists when individuals with equal needs are treated equally. Vertical equity exists when 
individuals with different needs are treated in proportion to differences between them (Culyer, 
2001). In O’Donnell et al. (2008) it is stated that horizontal equity principle is given more 
attention both in policy and research since a deviation from this principle has an implication 
on the distribution of health care in a system. Further, researchers assume vertical equity is 
satisfied on average.  
To measure equity, the distribution of need for medical care in the population should be 
determined. Empirically need is defined as the estimated demand for medical care conditional 
on some determinant factors using indirect standardization method.  
Norway has a universal health coverage system. As one of the components of the National 
Insurance Scheme (NIS)1
                                               
1 The other components are public pension system and other income transfers such as sickness, disability, 
unemployment and rehabilitation benefits. 
, the health care system is financed predominantly by the general tax 
system (Van Noord et al., 1998). Thus the health care use is expected to be distributed 
according to the equity principle.   
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The aim of this paper is to test and measure the degree of income-related inequality and 
inequity of medical care utilization, in the use of general practitioner (GP), private specialist 
and hospital specialist outpatient services in the Norwegian health care system. Further I will 
try to identify the major determinant factors that contribute to the income-related inequality. 
The research questions are: 
Does the utilization of medical care services differ between lower-income and higher-income 
individuals?  
What are the major contributing factors to income-related inequality? 
Concentration index (CI) is a methodological tool that is commonly used to measure the 
degree of income-related inequality and inequity in health and health care utilization. In this 
paper the measurement of the degree of inequality and inequity are illustrated by two 
approaches; a geometrical approach and a statistical approach. The two approaches are 
interrelated and consistent to each other. The geometric approach provides a quick intuitive 
understanding of the implication of the magnitudes and signs of the indices that measure the 
degree of inequality and inequity. Without a geometric illustration it would be a demanding 
task to interpret scalar values of the estimated indices. The statistical approach, particularly 
the “convenient regression” method, makes it possible to estimate concentration indices and 
their standard error conveniently, and thus to conduct statistical inferences. 
Geometrically, CI can be computed based on concentration curve. A concentration curve plots 
the cumulative proportion of health care use against the cumulative proportion of population 
ranked by income beginning with the lowest. If the concentration curve lies below (above) the 
equality (450) line, it indicates pro-rich (pro-poor) distribution of the medical care. If it 
coincides with the equality line, it indicates equal distribution of medical care use across 
income groups. The horizontal inequity index (HI) can also be computed using concentration 
curves. It requires first, to plot a need concentration curve to compute need CI. Then the HI is 
obtained as the difference between actual use CI and need CI. The magnitude of the indices 
range between -1 and +1, and the interpretations depends on the signs. Positive (negative) 
values of CI indicate inequality favoring the rich (poor). Similarly, positive (negative) values 
of HI indicate inequity favoring the rich (poor). A zero or insignificant value of CI (HI) 
indicates health care use is distributed fairly equally (equitably) across income groups.  The 
method I use to identify the major factors contributing to overall income-related inequality is 
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conceptually identical to the decomposition method used in Wagstaff et al. (2003), and it is 
based on the linear regression model. The decomposition method can also be used as a tool to 
identify policy relevant factors in a health care system.  
To measure these indices the Norwegian level of living conditions cross-sectional survey data 
of the year 2005 are used. All the inequality and inequity indices and decomposed inequalities 
are estimated using STATA software. 
The paper finds that the lower income groups are more likely to use GP and hospital specialist 
services intensively than the higher income groups. Moreover, lower income groups have 
higher need for the medical care. After controlling for need differences, no evidence of 
horizontal inequity is found in these two services. That is, GP and hospital specialist services 
are distributed fairly across income groups. However the result for the probability of private 
specialist indicates that there is horizontal inequity favoring the better-off.  
Decomposition results show that the most important variables that contribute to the overall 
pro-poor income-related inequality in the probability of GP and hospital specialist visit are 
need variables. The contributions of non-need explanatory variables to the inequality are very 
low. The decomposition results support the findings that assert the absence of horizontal 
inequity in the distribution of these medical care services. The results for the probability of 
private specialist visit show different outcomes. The largest percentage share of the pro-rich 
inequality is caused by non-need variables, particularly income and education.  
This study finds no evidence that the equity principle is violated in the hospital specialist and 
GP service utilization. However, the distribution of private specialist services favors the well-
off. The fact that the lower income groups have higher need for medical care, and are more 
intensive users of hospital specialist and GP services suggest inequity in health in the society. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Part two reviews theoretical and empirical 
literatures. In part three, methods of measuring inequality and inequity, and decomposition 
are discussed in detail. Part four provides an overview of the Norwegian health care system. 
In part five the data and variables used in empirical analysis are described. Part six presents 
the results and discussions. Finally, part seven provides some conclusions and remarks.  
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 The rationale for equity in health care  
In the welfare states medical service is commonly considered a social service that ought to be 
distributed according to need; not based on ability to pay or other socioeconomic 
characteristics. Following the introduction of National Health Service (NHS) in Britain in 
1948, other developed countries have also adopted universal health insurance coverage. These 
were achieved through several health care reforms at different time that replaced partial 
coverage and subsidies. Nowadays most of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries follows the universal coverage system (Cutler, 2002). There 
are several rationales for equity in health care services from different angles like legal and 
philosophical reasons. This paper is restricted to equity in health care services from the 
welfare economics point of view. 
Hurley (2000) takes health care as an economic good that is different from other commodities 
in a way that it creates market failure. Consequently, it requires a formulation of public policy 
to be distributed efficiently in the society. One public policy to achieve this is by introducing 
universal health insurance financed by general tax where each individual contributes 
according to his/her ability, and benefits from the health system equally (Blomqvist, 2008).  
Health care is also important for distributive justice. It is obvious that people live in different 
social strata. That is, people differ in their income, occupation, education and so on. If health 
care services are to be distributed through free markets it is, undoubtedly, the well-off people 
that can afford the most. People recognize that health is important because it is the well-being 
that enables other aspects of life to function. Thus they attach value to health and also accept 
the right of others to basic health care from the moral point of view. Kornai and Eggleston 
(2001) state that no one could declare that, for example, the rich should be saved and the poor 
is left to death for the lack of ability to pay for the medical services when both suffer from the 
same level of illness.  
The rationale behind universal coverage of medical services as a means for equitable 
distribution in health care stem from the specific characteristics of medical care services 
compared to other commodities. Hurley (2000) describes some distinctive features of health 
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care which include externalities and uncertainty of demand for health care. These 
characteristics cause market failure in health care market, and make the health sector one of 
the sectors that requires extensive government intervention. 
Externalities associated with health care services can lead to public involvement for the 
provision of the services efficiently. Some health care services such as vaccination to prevent 
communicable diseases have external effects. A preventive action taken by one person 
generates health benefits for other individuals without any compensation from these 
individuals to that person. This type of health services tend to be under-produced in an 
economy based on competitive markets as long as he/she is not compensated for the positive 
externalities generated. These services are better produced when the government takes the 
responsibility to produce them by itself or subsidize them.   
Market mechanism will not provide efficient allocation even in medical services that do not 
generate external effects. The uncertainty of events is the main cause for the invention of 
insurances. According to Arrow (1963) the demand for medical care, unlike for other 
commodities, is irregular and unpredictable because the uncertainty of the occurrences of 
most illness and injuries as well as the associated expenditures are unpredictable. People are 
aware that their future health is uncertain and they try to buy medical insurance to avoid 
financial risk of the bad days. Insurance has welfare improving effects in such a way that by 
pooling together the risk of different groups of people who buy insurance each individual can 
be protected against the financial risk of ill health. However, insurance markets themselves 
are subject to market failures because of the asymmetric information between the insurers and 
the buyers.  
Under commercial insurance, it is expected that individuals with greater risk requires full 
insurance coverage and the premium would be higher. If the insurer and the insured have 
exactly the same information about the risk of loss, the premium can be set to charge the 
insured to the amount that cover exactly the loss, other things being constant. However, if 
there is asymmetric information, the premium charged can be lower or higher than the cost of 
the loss. The asymmetric information causes adverse selection and risk selection (cream 
skimming) problems that lead to market failure in insurance market (Kornai and Eggleton, 
2001). Moral hazard in health care is also another problem induced by insurance. These 
phenomena of health insurance markets are described shortly in the following paragraphs. 
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Their implications for public policy related to universal coverage are given at the end of this 
subsection. 
Adverse selection arises when the insurer is unable to distinguish between high-risk and low-
risk medical insurance buyer individuals and then the insurer charges all individuals an 
average premium. At this level of premium some low-risk individuals will not buy the 
insurance and only high-risk individuals remains in the pool. This increases the cost of 
reimbursement. If the insurer raises the premium further in order to adjust to the high-risk 
individuals, the insurance may become so expensive. This again leads to that another segment 
of individuals with lower-risk leave the market. This process may go until individuals with 
the highest risk remain in the market; even until the market disappears. On the other hand, if 
the insurer is able to get information on the health status of individuals, he can cream-skim or 
pick only the low-risk individuals. He makes higher profit from insurance contracts leaving 
the high-risk group. In this case, the market is unable to offer insurance contracts to all buyers 
and fails to achieve efficient allocation of resources under uncertainty. 
Moral hazard in health insurance can occur at two levels. An individual who has full coverage 
of health insurance may not make an effort to avoid illness or injury; that is ex-ante moral 
hazard. This may not be the main cause of moral hazard in health insurance as the occurrence 
of illness may lead to some health risks and sufferings from pain. Thus no one wants to 
expose himself to such risks. The main source of moral hazard in health insurance is that after 
the illness has occurred the fully insured individual has no incentive to spare the use of any 
possible medical care whatever it costs as long as the marginal utility from the treatment is 
positive since medical care is paid by the insurer. This is known as ex-post moral hazard. This 
problem creates overconsumption of the medical services and leads to inefficiency in resource 
allocation. 
It can be seen from the discussions above that it is hard to achieve equity and efficiency of 
resource allocation in health care through free health insurance markets and this calls for 
some forms of government interventions. Blomqvist (2008) proposes public health insurance 
as one of possible alternatives and states that the most important advantage of universal health 
coverage is that it enables to eliminate the problems of adverse selection and cream-
skimming. Equity in medical care services can be achieved by the universal health insurance 
coverage where the government finances health care expenditures through general tax so that 
the risks of all individuals are pooled across all tax payers. Blomqvist states further that a well 
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designed and functioning public insurance can be evaluated by its strength to control and 
address the cost, equity and efficiency problems created by moral hazard and risk selection 
better than the private insurance.      
2.2    Determinants of health care utilization and 
their role in income-related inequality 
In welfare states where universal health insurance system is adopted, health care services are 
expected to be distributed based on the needs of the individuals for the services.  
It is obvious that people can naturally have different level of need for medical care according 
to their age, gender, health level as well as the choice of life-style. In practical measurement 
of inequity these variables are labeled as ‘need’ variables and socioeconomic factors such as 
income, occupation, level of education and place of residence can be labeled as ‘non-need’ 
variables.  Thus by implication, in the horizontal equity principle, socioeconomic factors 
shouldn't affect the utilization of medical care (Morris et al, 2003).  
In empirical analysis need for medical services comprises several factors and is considered as 
variable that cannot be measured directly rather proxied by demographic variables (age and 
gender) and morbidity variables (O'Donnell et al., 2008). Morbidity is measured by self 
assessed health, number of chronic conditions and level of effect of the chronic diseases on 
daily activities. Thus in a broad sense need for medical care is related to health status, 
morbidity, demographic and lifestyle factors. The computation of need for medical care in 
relation to need factors, using indirect standardization method, is presented in section 3.1.  
Life-style factors such as smoking, drinking alcohol and physical training can also be 
considered as the cause of fair inequalities in use as people should be held responsible for 
their behavioral choices.  Flurbaey (2008, p. 2) states the responsibilities of individuals that 
“once rights and resources are equally allotted to all individuals, the difference in well-being 
that follow from different views of good life and from the subsequent different uses of the 
rights and resources are down to individuals' responsibility”.  
The term lifestyle can have a broader meaning than the way it is used in this paper. World 
Health Organization (1989) takes it as a general way of living condition of an individual 
where the behavior of the individual is determined by socio-cultural factors and personal 
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characteristics. In this paper lifestyle is perceived like it is stated in Contoyannis and Jones 
(2004) as some personal set of behaviors that are considered to influence health and 
eventually the use of health care and to reflect only individual's free choice to practice. 
As this paper is all about the measurement and interpretation of the degree of inequality and 
inequity, it is important to make clear these concepts and the differences and relations 
between them. In the utilization of health care, inequality can arise either for the reason that 
individuals have different need for health care which is considered to be fair inequality or that 
they are treated unequally when they deserve to be treated equally. Inequity has a sense of 
unfair distribution of medical resources when they ought to be distributed fairly among those 
individuals need it. It is worth to quote Gravelle et al. (2006, p. 193) to make the two concepts 
more clear. “There is inequality in consumption when different individuals receive different 
amounts of care. Inequity, on the other hand, implies that individuals do not receive the 
amounts of care that they need”.   
2.3  Empirical literature 
There are several empirical literatures at international level that test and examine to what 
length those countries with universal health care coverage have in practice realized the equity 
principle. Most of the literatures apply concentration index (CI) which is known as standard 
method for the income-related inequality measurement.  This method is also applicable in 
countries without universal health care system as a tool to examine the severity of inequity in 
health care utilization across income groups.   
Van Doorslaer et al. (2000), Van Doorslaer, Masseria et al. (2004) and Lu et al. (2007) focus 
on comparing income-related inequity in the utilization of health care across-countries using 
cross-sectional data. Applying a similar method, Morris et al. (2003), Allin and Hurley 
(2009), Grasdal and Monstad (2008) examine country specific inequity. Countries are 
different in their health care system, in the amounts and type of resources they use. But the 
cross-country equity studies are believed to help policy makers to learn from the experience 
of different systems for the improvement of health sector performance. One of the challenging 
areas for policy makers is the equitable distribution of health care services according to need.  
In Norway there are only a few studies of income-related inequalities in health care that are 
based on concentration index. Van Doorslaer, Masseria et al. (2004) study income-related 
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inequality in the use of medical care in 21 OECD countries. In this study Norway is included 
with living condition survey data of the year 2000. The study investigates equality by dividing 
the physician services into three parts, i.e. all physicians, general practitioner and specialists. 
Accordingly, the results from the study indicate that the probability of all physician visit 
concentration index is negative but not significantly different from zero. When need 
difference is controlled, the resulting horizontal inequity index is positive and statistically 
significant indicating total physician service is distributed in favor of the rich. 
When the utilization of medical care is investigated separately by GP and specialist services, 
the horizontal index shows that the distribution of GP visits is almost equitable across the 
income groups. However, access to specialist services does not appear to be distributed like 
GP service does. The horizontal inequity index is positive and statistically significant 
implying pro-rich inequity.  
Applying similar methods to the OECD study, Grasdal and Monstad (2008) investigate the 
change of inequities in the utilization of physician services over time based on data from the 
Surveys of Living Conditions for the years 2000, 2002 and 2005. The results from the 
investigation show that there is no evidence of horizontal inequity in the utilization of GP and 
hospital outpatient services. However there exist significant inequities in the probability of 
private specialist services but the inequity indices are declining over time. The reason is that 
the marginal effect of income has decreased over time and income is the major factor that 
contributes to inequality in the probability of private specialist visit. It is believed that the role 
of income decreased as using private specialist, to bypass waiting lists, might have decreased 
following the introduction of patient list system of 2001 and the 2002 reform in the hospital 
ownership.  
One of the objectives of the reforms was to ensure equal accessibility of health care services. 
Godager et al. (2007) evaluate the introduction of patient list system in terms of use access 
and satisfaction of patients. The evaluation result shows that improvement in the capacity of 
GP services in a municipality affects the number of contacts with specialists positively. The 
reason is that the rise in the number of GP per municipality increases the referral to specialists 
because of the doctors compete for patients.  
Based on only regression analysis in the study of the impact of accessibility on the use of 
specialist health care in Norway, Iversen and Kopperud (2005) investigate the relationship 
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between use of the private specialist medical care service and socioeconomic variables and 
geographical accessibility. They found that use of private specialist service is positively 
related to educational level of individual, household income and geographical accessibility to 
the specialists. They also compare how self-assessed health status is related to the use of 
private specialist service and hospital outpatient services. The results show that self assessed 
health was closely related to the hospital outpatient services and not to private specialist 
services. From this they conclude that the ambition of equitable delivery of health care 
services in public hospitals are fulfilled but that of private specialist services financed by 
public fund does not meet the goal of equity in health care services. The study thus indicates 
the prevalence of socioeconomic-related inequity in the Norwegian health care system. 
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3 Measuring income-related inequality 
and inequity  
Most studies in health sector use concentration index as a standard tool in the measurement of 
the degree of inequalities and inequities in health and health care. Researchers are attracted to 
it for its intuitive geometric interpretation and statistical computability from individual level 
sample data. In the following we will see how the concentration index of health care is 
computed and interpreted geometrically and statistically. The two methods are interrelated 
and are consistent with one another as they can be computed using results from same sample 
data. At the end of this section the decomposability of the concentration index into health care 
use determinant factors will be discussed. These methods of inequality and inequity 
measurements will be used in the empirical part of this paper. 
3.1 Geometric approach 
Geometrically, a measure of degree of income-related inequality in the utilization of medical 
care can be obtained by computing concentration index based on a concentration curve. The 
concentration curve LM(r) in figure 3.1.1 plots cumulative proportion of medical care use 
against the cumulative proportion r of the population ranked by income beginning with the 
least advantaged (Van Doorslaer, 2008). It is analogous to a Lorenz curve which is commonly 
used as an indication of income distribution in a given population for a given period.  
Figure 3.1.1 Concentration curve of medical care utilization 
              1    
   
                                                      A 
                                     LM(r)           
                                                                                          B 
                                              
                            0                                                                       1 
Cumulative 
proportion of 
medical care 
use
Cumulative proportion of population, ranked by income 
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In figure 3.1.1 the concentration index, denoted by 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 , in the utilization of medical care can 
be defined as the ratio of the area between the concentration curve and the equality (450) line 
and the total area below the equality line. Since the area below the equality line is exactly 1/2, 
in the unit box, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀  would be twice the area between the concentration curve and the equality 
line. It can also be written as:2
(1)                                          𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 = 1 − 2∫ 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀(𝑟𝑟)10 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟    
 
The distance of the concentration curve from line of equity in both sides will tell the level and 
direction of inequality. When LM(r) coincides with the equality line, there is no income-
related inequality in the utilization of medical care and CM would be zero. That is, the poorest  
𝑘𝑘% of the population obtains 𝑘𝑘% of of total medical care services. When LM(r) lies below the 
equality line it indicates that the poorest  𝑘𝑘% of the population obtains less than 𝑘𝑘% of the 
total medical care services. The remaining larger percentage goes to the richer group favoring 
the rich and CM is positive. On the other hand when LM(r) lies above the equality line the 
distribution of medical care is pro-poor and CM takes negative value. The range of the CM lies 
between -1 and +1. In the extreme cases when CM is -1, all medical care utilization is 
concentrated in the hands of the most disadvantaged person while +1 indicates all utilization 
is concentrated in the hands of the most well-off person. 
As it is mentioned earlier, horizontal inequity is observed when utilization of medical care 
varies significantly with socioeconomic factors after variation due to need factors is corrected 
for. The degree of this variation can be measured by horizontal inequity index (HI). 
Horizontal inequity can be illustrated geometrically using concentration curves. To measure 
horizontal inequity index we need first to compute the need for medical care. One way to 
compute need is by indirect standardization method (O’Donnell, O. et al, 2008). 
Suppose that the actual medical care received by an individual in a given period is denoted by 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 . The indirect standardization method generates the need for medical care,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖∗ by first 
estimating actual medical care use, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 , on the vectors of need 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗  and non-need 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘factors. For 
linear regression model it is defined as 
(2)                                       𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  
                                               
2 Area under concentration curve is obtained by integration equation,  𝐵𝐵 = ∫ 𝐿𝐿(𝑟𝑟)10 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟.  𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴+𝐵𝐵  by 
definition, and since  A+B =1/2, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 = 2𝐴𝐴 = 1 − 2𝐵𝐵. Then 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 = 1 − 2∫ 𝐿𝐿(𝑟𝑟)10 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟. 
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where α, 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 , 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘  are  vectors of parameters and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  is an error term.  
In some studies like Van Doorslaer et al. (2000) only need factors are included in the regression. 
Gravelle, 2003 criticizes the exclusion of non-need variables for it creates omitted variable 
bias. The bias occurs when an omitted variable is correlated at least to one of the regressors 
and determines the medical care use. As a result in the estimation of need-expected values the 
coefficients of need variables pick up the effect of the omitted variable. This in turn has an 
influence on the estimate of horizontal index.  
The problem is solved by including non-need variables in the regression as in equation (2) 
above. Then the need for medical care for each individual is the predicted value from this 
regression when non-need variables are replaced by their mean values. Setting the non-need 
variables to their mean values in the prediction of need neutralize their impact (Van Doorslaer 
et al., 2004). Thus need is the predicted value of 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  given the determinant factors obtained by 
storing the predicted values.   
(3)                                       𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛼𝛼� + ∑ ?̂?𝛽𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾�𝑘𝑘𝑧𝑧?̅?𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  
Thus 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖∗ measures the expected amount of medical care that individuals with the same need 
characteristics would have received if the system had treated them equally, on average. In 
other words it is the amount of medical care an individual, on average, expected to receive 
given his/her need characteristics (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000). The concentration 
curve corresponding to need can be expressed by 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁(𝑟𝑟), and the associated concentration 
index  𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁  is computed by: 
(4)                                       𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 = 1 − 2∫ 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁(𝑟𝑟)10 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟 
Geometrically, horizontal inequity can be computed by comparing the position of 
concentration curve of actual medical care use 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀(𝑟𝑟) and need concentration curve 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁(𝑟𝑟). HI 
is then defined as twice the area between the actual medical care uses and need concentration 
curves or the difference between the corresponding concentration indices: 
(5)                                       𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 2∫ [ 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁10 (𝑟𝑟) − 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀(𝑟𝑟)]𝑑𝑑(𝑟𝑟) = 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 − 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁  
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 Figure 3.1.2 Concentration curves for actual and expected medical care utilization 
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By investigating the share of need and the share of actual use by each income group, we can 
measure the extent of horizontal inequity. We start with the case when the need concentration 
curve 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁(𝑟𝑟) coincides with the actual use concentration curve 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀(𝑟𝑟). In this case the share of 
medical care use of each group equals the share of its need and there is no horizontal inequity. 
For example, the share of need and the share of actual use of the poorest 𝑘𝑘%of the population 
are equal. And the share of need and the share of actual use of the remaining richer 100% - 
𝑘𝑘% of the population are also equal.  
If 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁(𝑟𝑟) lies above 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀(𝑟𝑟), the higher income groups obtain a higher share of medical care 
than their share of need (Van Doorslaer et al., 2000). At the same time the lower income groups 
obtain lower share of actual medical care than their share of need, and we say that there is 
horizontal inequity favoring the better-off. In terms of concentration index from 
corresponding curves, the difference between 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀  and 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 , i.e. HI is positive. That is why we 
say that positive HI index indicates pro-rich distribution of medical care. Conversely, when 
𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁(𝑟𝑟) lies below 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀(𝑟𝑟), with similar analysis and computation we arrive at a negative HI that 
indicate the existence of  horizontal inequity that favors the lower income groups.  
Van Doorslaer, et al. (2000, p. 557) emphasize also that coinciding curves for need and actual 
use that asserts zero HI provide a sufficient but not a necessary condition for no horizontal 
inequity. They give an example that HI can also be zero if “inequity favoring the poor in one 
part of the distribution exactly offsets inequity favoring the rich in another”. 
 
Cumulative proportion of population, ranked by income 
Cumulative 
proportion of 
medical care 
use 
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3.2 Covariance approach 
The concentration indices that measure health care inequalities discussed above are generally 
estimated from sample observations.  Kakwani et al. (1997) observed that it is important to 
test whether the value of the estimated indices are statistically significant. They developed 
“convenient regression” method, to estimate concentration indices, related to the concept of 
the relationship between the Gini index and standard regression coefficient in Lerman and 
Yitzihaki (1984).3
For individual-level data where 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  is medical consumption of the 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ  individual, 
concentration index can be computed using empirical “convenient covariance” formula 
(Kakwani et al., 1997) which is analogous to the convenient way of calculating the Gini 
coefficient in Lerman and Yitzihaki (1984) :
 With the convenient regression approach it is possible to measure indices 
and their standard errors at the same time so that one can undertake statistical inferences.  
4
(6)                          𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 =  2𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚� ∑ (𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 –𝑚𝑚�)(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 1/2)  
 
                                     = 2
𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚�
∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 1  
where 𝑛𝑛 is sample size, 𝑚𝑚�  is the sample mean of 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  is the fractional rank of 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ  
individual in income distribution. Based on the relationship between the concentration index, 
and the covariance of medical care and fractional rank in equation (6), the “convenient 
regression” model can be written as: 
(7)                                  2𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2 �𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚� � = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  
where 𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2 is the variance of fractional rank and considered to be constant. The OLS estimator 
of 𝛽𝛽1is 
?̂?𝛽1 =  2𝜎𝜎�𝑅𝑅2𝑚𝑚� 1𝑛𝑛∑(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 −𝑚𝑚�)(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 −  1/2)1
𝑛𝑛
∑(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 1/2)2  =  2𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚��𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 1 
                                               
3 Running regressing mi on Ri, mi = α +βRi +vi, yields a slope coefficient β=cov(mi, Ri)/var(Ri), together with  
equation (6)  this is used to formulate convenient regression. 
4 The fractional rank Ri is computed by Ri = i/n, where i= 1, 2 . . . n (ranking individuals by their income from 
lowest to highest; 1to n). Thus the highest value of Ri is 1. For the uniformly distributed Ri between 0 and 1 the 
mean of Ri is 1/2.  
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which is the same as the concentration index in equation (4); where the sample variance is  
𝜎𝜎�𝑅𝑅
2 = 1
𝑛𝑛
∑(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 1/2)2. The standard error of ?̂?𝛽1 is then the standard error of the concentration 
index 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀  and can be used to conduct t-test to determine the statistical significance of the 
index. 
Similarly, concentration index of need and its standard error can be computed using: 
(8)                                     2𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2 �𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖∗𝑚𝑚�∗ � = 𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  
where 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖∗ is predicted medical care (need) 𝑚𝑚�∗ is its sample mean and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  is an error term. 
Then the estimator of β2 measures need concentration index 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 . 
Unlike the horizontal inequity index that can be computed from the difference between 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀  
and 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 , its standard error cannot be easily obtained in the same manner. The reason is that 
sample estimates of 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀  and 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁  are not independently distributed (Kakwani et al., 1997). The 
standard error of HI can rather be computed from a convenient regression: 
(9)                                    2𝜎𝜎𝑅𝑅2 �𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚� − 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖∗𝑚𝑚�∗ � = 𝛼𝛼3 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖  
The OLS estimator of 𝛽𝛽3 and its standard error represent the estimate of HI index and 
standard error of HI index respectively.  
Based on the definition and explanations of inequality and inequity given in section 2.2, in the 
preceding paragraphs we have seen the methods how to quantify and analyze inequalities and 
inequities in the health care utilization. Accordingly the inequality is measured by 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀  and the 
inequity is measured by HI using equations (7) and (9), respectively.   
3.3 Decomposing concentration index 
Concentration index measures the overall income-related inequality in health care utilization. 
It is possible to decompose the concentration index in order to assess the contribution of each 
need and non-need determinant factor to overall inequality. Wagstaff et al. (2003) propose the 
decomposition of concentration index of health as the sum of the degree of income-related 
inequality in each determinant factor weighted by the elasticity of the health with respect to 
that factor. The decomposition presupposes a linearly additive explanatory model such as, in 
our case, linear regression model of health care utilization 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖   given by 
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(10)                                    𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  
where  𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘  is a set of all need and non-need related determinant factors of health care 
utilization, 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘  are parameters and  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  is an error term. Plugging this expression into equation 
(6) one can get the overall concentration index which is written as:5
(11)                               𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥̅𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚� 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚�  
 
where  𝑚𝑚�  is the mean of 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 ,  ?̅?𝑥𝑘𝑘  is the mean of 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖  and  𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘  is the concentration index of factor 
𝑘𝑘 obtained analogously to 𝐶𝐶 𝑀𝑀 in equation (6).  From the expression it can clearly be seen that 
the degree of  the over all income-related inequality in health care use is the weighted sum of 
the concentration indices 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘  of each factor with respect to income and a residual inequality  
𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝜀𝜀
𝑚𝑚�
 due to the error term. The weights are the elasticity of health care use with respect to each 
factor evaluated at sample means which are expressed by 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥̅𝑘𝑘
𝑚𝑚�
. The last term in (9) is a 
residual component of inequality that cannot be explained by variations in  𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘  related to 
income. In the residual component  𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝜀𝜀
𝑚𝑚�
,  𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝜀𝜀   is a generalized concentration index for ε 
(Wagstaff et al., 2003) and defined as 
(12)                  𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶ε = 2𝑛𝑛  ∑ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  
One can also deduce that a determinant factor contributes substantially to overall inequality if 
the determinant itself is unequally distributed by income, i.e. 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘  is different from zero and if it 
substantially determines health care use (𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 ≠ 0) (Van Doorslaer, 2008). However, if one of 
the two components is zero, the variable contributes nothing to the overall income-related 
inequality index.  
The decomposition quantifies the inequalities attributed to each determinant factor. Thus it 
can be used as a tool to identify which factors are important for a prevailing health care 
policy. It also helps to measure the extent of inequalities attributable to policy relevant and 
policy irrelevant factors. As it is mentioned in section (2.2), variables are distinguished as 
need variables if their effects on health care are unavoidable or if they reflect individual 
responsibility. In some cases categorizing the determinants into policy relevant and irrelevant 
                                               
5 The detail proof is given in wagstaff et al (2003). Expression 
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥̅𝑘𝑘
𝑚𝑚�
  represents the elasticity of medical care 
utilization with respect to each variable evaluated at their mean, where 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 = 𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 , for linear regression. 
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factors depends on the policy circumstances. Some factors can be policy relevant in some 
circumstances and non-relevant in other circumstances. For example as it is stated in Gravelle 
(2003) even age can be a policy relevant variable even though it is impossible to alter the age 
distribution of the population. Suppose age and income are denoted by x and y respectively. It 
is possible to change the effect of age on the use of medical care (𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥 ) by targeting the health 
of elderly or altering the joint distribution of age and income (𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ) by taxation policy.  
If we could clearly identify need (policy irrelevant) variables say as 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁 and non-need (policy 
relevant) variables as 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , we can compute a policy relevant partial concentration index using 
decomposition equation in (13). This is usually known as horizontal inequity index which is 
obtained by removing inequalities due to need variables from the overall concentration index.  
(13)                   𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 − ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥̅𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚�𝑘𝑘  𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁   
The horizontal inequity measure HI obtained in this way is exactly the same as HI obtained in 
the convenient regression method when “need” is estimated using linear regression models in 
indirect standardization.  
The advantage of linearity of the regression model is that its additivity facilitates the 
decomposition and makes the interpretation easier. However, medical care utilization data are 
better estimated by nonlinear models which make decomposition impossible. 
To restore the mechanism of decomposition Van Doorslaer et al. (2004) propose 
decomposition based on a re-linearization of the nonlinear models by applying approximation 
technique. The results from this method are only approximates. It is reported that the HI 
derived from this method is not identical to the one derived from the concentration indices. 
However several studies of inequality in health care witness that model specification is not so 
strict. Studies for many OECD countries and other countries show that decomposition results 
differ little and that HI is not sensitive to the choice between least squares and non-linear 
estimators (Van Doorslaer et al., 2000; Van Doorslaer and Masseria  et al., 2004; Allin and 
Hurley, 2009; Lu et al.,  2007). Given the evidence I resort to use ordinary least squares 
estimators in decomposition for simplicity and convenience. 
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4 Overview of Norwegian health care  
system 
The Norwegian health care system has universal health care coverage, and it is financed 
mainly through general tax system. Thus every resident has access to medical care based on 
his/her need irrespective of his/her income, social status, and place of residence. As it is 
mentioned in section 2.3, empirical studies show that the equity principle is achieved in the 
primary health care and public provision of specialist services. The health care system has 
accomplished remarkable improvements in health status of the population over time. 
According to the Norwegian central statistics office life expectancy in Norway is among the 
highest in the world. As of 2007 the life expectancy of Norwegian men reached 78.2 years, 
compared to 71 in 1970 and that of women reached 82.7 years, compared to 77 for the same 
years. Infant mortality rate (per 1000) has fallen dramatically from 8 in 1980s to 3.2 in 2006-
2007 (www.ssb.no). Despite these achievements, there are areas that need further 
improvements. Report no.20 (2006-2007) to the Storing indicates that there exists 
socioeconomic variation in health. This can be attributed to that people are living in different 
social strata where people with higher income have best health. This can also be reflected in 
the consumption of health care that people with high income and education have higher 
probability to use private specialist services than lower-socioeconomic groups (Iverson and 
Kopperud, 2005).  
In Norway the health care system has reached to this level through several health care 
reforms. One important institution is the National Insurance Scheme (NIS), which was 
established in 1967. Among major reforms recently undertaken are the 2001 reform of 
Regular General Practitioner scheme and the 2002 hospital reform. The reforms were 
undertaken with the aim of improving equity and efficiency in the delivery of health care and 
efficient allocation of resources in the health sector in general.  
In reference to the reforms, current health care provision can be classified into three 
categories. The first is that where most of the specialized medical care services are provided 
by the central government through the five regionally organized state health enterprises. The 
second is the primary health care provision by municipalities through contracts signed with 
predominantly privately owned general practitioners (GP) practices in the framework of NIS. 
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As a third category there are also few privately owned specialist and GP health care service 
providers without the contract with municipalities whose financial sources are totally from 
revenue collected from the services provided. 
The 2001reform of the patient list system requires inhabitants to be listed to a GP with vacant 
list and the GPs to have a contract with municipalities in order to benefit from the NIS. Under 
the patient list scheme the GPs are required to provide primary health services to the patient 
listed in his practice or as a 'gatekeepers' to refer to specialists. The private practice GPs 
receive income from the services they provide in three forms and each form of income 
believed to constitute one third of the total annual income of a practice on average (Iversen 
and Kopperud, 2005). The first is the fee-for-service payments where a GP is paid fees from 
the national insurance for the various services provided to patients. Second the GP gets a 
capitation fee from the municipalities he/she signed a contract, i.e. a fixed amount of money 
per patient listed to his/her practice irrespective of the type of patient. The third is a 
reasonable standard copayment the patient pays per visit. However the income of the few GPs 
that provide services without having contracts with a municipality is totally from the fee they 
charge the patients they treat.  
Most of specialized medical services are provided in the public hospitals. There are also 
private specialist’s practices engaged in providing specialized medical services. In the history 
of health sector reforms most of the reforms undertaken were to the specialized service 
provision. The specialist health services provision encountered problems such as long waiting 
list and time for some specialist treatment. In addition, inequality in the supply of hospital 
services and the over time increasing cost concerns can be mentioned (Van Noord et al., 
1998).  
Before 1974 hospitals and other specialized medical services were administered by the 19 
counties. Since 1974 the 19 counties were grouped into five health regions, maintaining the 
ownership of the respective counties, headed by regional health committees formed from the 
representatives of respective counties. These institutional setups had been operative until the 
2002 when the government overtook the ownership of hospitals by establishing five regional 
health enterprises which are independent of counties but each reporting to the ministry of 
health and social affairs. 
21 
 
Concerning hospital financing; before 1997 block budgets were allocated by the government 
to the counties. The counties, in turn, allocate the budget to the hospitals. Since 1997 the 
block budget grant to the counties was replaced by a grant based on the number and 
composition of treatment in the hospital which is known to be Diagnosis Related Group 
(DRG) approach. The introduction of this activity based budget was to alleviate the increase 
in the hospital expenditures following the legislation of the waiting-time guarantee in 1990. 
The legislation required that the county councils supposed to ensure treatments within six 
months for patients who have been given a waiting-time guarantee. This has created a 
pressure on the budget of the hospitals (Hagen and Kaarbøe, 2006).  
It is in this post reform period of health care system and historical background that we are 
going to investigate the prevalence and extent of inequity in physician services. 
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5 Data and variable specifications 
To test and measure the degree of income-related inequality and inequity in the utilization of 
health care in Norway I use Norwegian level of living conditions survey data of the year 
2005. The survey data is collected and compiled by the Norwegian central statistics office 
(SSB) and provided by Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). The survey was 
based on 10,000 randomly selected observations on individuals aged 16 and older. It was 
conducted through interview and postal questionnaires (Hougen, 2006). The survey contains 
data on medical care utilization measured by physician visits, health status, lifestyle, 
demographic (age and gender), and socioeconomic (income, education, employment, marital 
status, birth place and residence area) of the groups. Data on income, education and 
employment conditions of the groups in the sample are added to the dataset from 
administrative records by the central statistics office. 
The response rate in the sample is about 70% resulting in 6766 net observations. The 
remaining 30% of the sample population are non-respondents. Among other things the main 
reason for not to respond is unwillingness to participate in the survey (Hougen, 2006). In the 
data-set, population density and cigarette smoking variables have significant number of 
missing values. To keep the number of observations as large as possible the missing values of 
these variables are replaced by the average of the observed values on subcategories of the 
respective variables. After correcting for missing values and outliers, the sample is reduced to 
6699 observations. A statistical summary of the variables used in this paper is shown in table 
5.1.  
5.1 Medical care utilization 
Medical care utilization is measured by the probability of GP and medical specialist visits. 
Specialist visit is divided into specialist visit outside hospitals which is considered to be 
private specialist services and policlinic specialist visit in public hospitals.  In the survey each 
individual is asked whether he/she has contacted GP and specialists, and the number of times 
he/she contacted in the past 12 months in 2005. The empirical analysis has three binary 
dependent variables: the probability of GP, of private specialist and of hospital specialist 
outpatient visits. 
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Table 5.1 Statistical summary and variable description, N=6699   
Variable description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent v.      
proGP_vst Probability of GP visit .7021944 .4573277 0 1 
prpvtsp_vst Probability of private specialist visit .170921 .376468 0 1 
prhos_sp_vst Probability of hospital specialist visit .2200328 .4142994 0 1 
Need variables      
morbidity      
sah_good Self assessed health- good or v. good .813405 .3896152 0 1 
sah_fair Self assessed health- fair .1280788 .3342025 0 1 
sah_poor Self assessed health- poor or v. poor .0585162 .2347345 0 1 
num_cron Number of chronic diseases 1.35677 1.871161 0 17 
no_cron Has no chronic disease .4228989 .4940565 0 1 
cron_sever Chronic affects daily activ. severely .1079266 .3103108 0 1 
cron_somlit Chronic affects daily activ. Some/little .37319 .4836881 0 1 
cron_noefct Chronic does not affect .0959845 .2945919 0 1 
Lifestyle var.      
nonsmok Non-cigarette smoker .6592029 .4740126 0 1 
daily_sm Daily cigarette-smoker .2434692 .4292079 0 1 
smt_sm rarely cigarette smoker .097328 .296426 0 1 
notrain Never do physical exercise .1564413 .3633003 0 1 
rare_trai  physical exer. less than once a week .1347962 .3415313 0 1 
often_trai physical exer. Once or more a week .7087625 .4543666 0 1 
drink_mis Missing data on alcohol .2861621 .4519998 0 1 
nodrink Do not drink alcohol .0798627 .2711007 0 1 
som_drink Drink alcohol 1-3 times per month .3770712 .4846892 0 1 
more_drink Drink alcohol 1-7 times per week .256904 .4369586 0 1 
Age-sex dum.      
m16_29 Male, age 16-29 .1137483 .317529 0 1 
m30_45 Male, age 30-45 .1495746 .3566805 0 1 
m46_59 Male, age 46-59 .1256904 .3315249 0 1 
m60_ Male, age above 60 .1158382 .3200547 0 1 
f16_29 Female, age 16-29 .1055381 .3072685 0 1 
f30_45 Female, age 30-45 .1533065 .3603095 0 1 
f46_59 Female, age 46-59 .1177788 .32237 0 1 
f60_ Female, age above 60 .1185252 .3232531 0 1 
Non-need var.      
lninc Log of equivalent income 12.41092 .5965698 .69 17.46 
popd_mis Missing data on population density .2098821 .4072546 0 1 
pdens1 Residence area, population < 2000  .087625 .2827699 0 1 
pdens2 Residence area, population 2000-20000 .2695925 .4437812 0 1 
pdens3 Residence area, pop. 20000-100000 .1946559 .3959651 0 1 
pdens4 Residence area, pop. Above 100000  .2382445 .4260413 0 1 
reg1 Region1- Oslo and Akerhus .2177937 .4127772 0 1 
reg2 Region2- Hedmark and Oppland .0841917 .2776958 0 1 
reg3 Region3- East .1846544 .3880459 0 1 
reg4 Region4- Agder and Rogaland .1347962 .3415313 0 1 
reg5 Region5- West .1798776 .3841141 0 1 
reg6 Region6- Trondelag .0918047 .2887717 0 1 
reg7 Region7- North .1068816 .3089858 0 1 
unmaried single .3700552 .4828552 0 1 
maried Married or registered partner .4836543 .49977 0 1 
w_d_s Widow or separated .1462905 .3534236 0 1 
empl Employed .6741305 .4687338 0 1 
mil_stu Student or on military service .0738916 .261614 0 1 
pensj retired .1298701 .3361856 0 1 
unempl unemployed .1221078 .3274347 0 1 
no_edu Non-educated .0008957 .0299163 0 1 
joun_edu Have 1-7 or 8-10 years education  .2760113 .4470558 0 1 
high_edu Have 11-14 years education  .4334975 .4955947 0 1 
coll_edu College and above. 14 + years edu. .2739215 .4460025 0 1 
bNorway Born in Norway .9281982 .2581787 0 1 
bEuro Born in Europe .0370205 .188826 0 1 
bUtEur Born outside Europe .0347813 .1832391 0 1 
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From the statistical summary table we can see that in Norway about 70% of the population 
visits general practitioners at least once a year.6
5.2 Determinant factors 
 The table also shows that specialists are 
visited less frequently than GPs. This can be due to the fact that the GPs serve as the “door 
keeper” to the specialists. A patient has to contact his doctor first to be referred to specialists. 
Only 22% of the population visits specialists in public hospitals while only 17% of the 
population visits private medical specialists.  
As Norway has a universal health care system, medical care is expected to be distributed 
according to need. In assessing the income-related inequity of medical care, the determinant 
factors of medical care use are categorized into two parts based on the analysis given in the 
theoretical part, section 2.2. 
Those factors that reflect characteristics internal to the individual behavior and unavoidable 
conditions are taken as need variables. Those that are external to the individual and ought not 
to determine the medical care use according to the equity principle are categorized as non-
need variables. This categorization is shown in the statistical summary table.  
In the empirical analysis need is proxied by morbidity, age-gender, and lifestyle variables. 
Morbidity is represented by three categories of self-assessed health status (SAH), the 
existence of chronic (long standing) diseases and the level of effects of the chronic disease on 
the daily activities of the groups. In the survey each individual was asked to rate his/her health 
status as very good, good, fair, poor and very poor. The groups were also asked how many 
chronic diseases they had (from some list of diseases categorized as chronic) and to rate the 
effects these sicknesses have on their daily activities (severe, some, little and no effects). 
From table 5.1 we can see that about 81% of the population in the sample reported good or 
very good health in year 2005. About 42% of the population did not have a chronic disease.  
But an individual had 1.35 chronic diseases on average. Age-gender dummies are created 
from the reaction of age and gender dummies to clearly identify the influence of age groups 
by sex on medical care utilizations. Each age-sex group is distributed in the sample 
representing 11-15% of the population. Lifestyle variables are represented by dummies of 
smoking, alcohol consumption and physical exercises. The survey indicates that about 70% of 
                                               
6  In the survey questionnaire the GP visit includes regular individual doctor, doctor at emergency center, 
school doctors and firm doctors. 
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the population is non-smokers and equally many undertake physical exercises. Only 8% do 
not drink alcohol; the rest takes alcohol at least once a month. 
In this study the non-need variables are household income after tax, region, population 
density, education, marital status, occupation and birth place of the groups in the sample.  
For the income variable, household income after tax is chosen because income after tax is 
expected to be more equally distributed than gross income because taxation of income 
considers family size and other economic conditions of a household. In this paper, income 
after tax is again readjusted to equivalent income for the household size. It is obvious that the 
higher the size of a household, the bigger resources are required to maintain a living standard. 
On the other hand there is an advantage of ‘economies of scale’ or cost advantage in 
consumption for the household as they live together. That is, a household expend less, for 
example, for electricity and housing by living together than they as a group would have done 
if each live alone. In the computation of income-related inequity household income is 
adjusted using “equivalence scale” method. There are different types of equivalence scales7
                                               
7 Other equivalence scales such as ‘OECD equivalence scale’ assigns a value of 1 to the first household member, 
0.7 to each additional adult and 0.5 to each child. The ‘OECD modified scale’ assigns a value of 1 to the first 
household member, 0.5 to each additional adult and 0.3 to each child.  
. 
Here I use square root scale which divides the household income by the square root of the 
household size (www.oecd.org). Region and the population density of the residence area of 
the individual included to examine the effects of regional variation, in terms of population 
size and settlement pattern, on medical care utilization. Most health care facilities are 
concentrated in the densely populated and urban areas. As a result people in these areas have 
better access to medical services. In addition, regional variation may reflect socioeconomic 
differences. People living in urban areas usually tend to be wealthier and have better access to 
secondary care services. Education affects medical care use in several ways. The higher 
educated a person is, the better she/he to produce health, and all other thing equal, the less 
frequent to use medical care. On the other hand, a highly educated person can make higher 
income and can use private specialist services to bypass waiting lists in public hospitals 
specialist services whenever necessary. Moreover an educated person can understand and 
explain better her health status, and can benefit more from the system. Occupation, marital 
status and country of origin are expected to affect efficiency of health production and thus the 
utilization of medical care. 
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6 Estimation  results 
6.1 Inequality and inequity  
The results of convenient regressions based on equation (7) - (9) are presented in table 6.1 
below for the three types of medical care utilizations. For each type of medical care the degree 
of inequality in actual medical care use and need, and the degree of horizontal inequity are 
shown. The signs of the values of these indices and their interpretations are clearly stated in 
section (3.1). Based on this theoretical background the empirical results shown in table 6.1 
will be discussed separately for each types of medical care. In addition, graphical 
representation of inequalities and inequities are presented to make the discussion more clear. 
Table 6.1 presents the estimated indices from two regression model specifications. The first is 
when the need for the medical care is estimated using logit and the second is when linear 
regression model is used for comparison. As it can be seen from the table the two model 
specifications provide similar results for the horizontal inequity indices (HI).  More 
importantly the statistical significances of the indices do not change with the change of model 
specification. This will allow us to use the linear regression model to make decomposition of 
the overall income-related concentration indices possible in the next subsection. 
It is important to point out some general features of the results in the table. For all three types 
of medical care the indices are very small though some are statistically significant. All are 
below 0.1 in absolute value. The figures are small in reference to that the indices should fall 
within the range of [-1, 1] and the more the indices closer to -1 or 1, the more inequality is 
observed. This may indicate that medical care use differences and distribution in Norway do 
not show considerable inequalities or inequities. From the table it can also be seen that in all 
types of medical care the need concentration index is negative. In general, it is the lower 
income population that more likely to need medical care at all levels of services, i.e. the 
primary and secondary services. 
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Table 6.1 Concentration indices for GP, private specialist and hospital specialist services when need is 
estimated using logit and linear regression models 
Medical care 
Index when need is estimated 
using logit model 
Index when need is estimated 
using linear regression model 
 𝑪𝑪𝑴𝑴  𝑪𝑪𝑵𝑵 𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯 𝑪𝑪𝑴𝑴  𝑪𝑪𝑵𝑵 𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯 
General 
practitioner services 
-.0133 
(-2.89) 
-.0185 
(-12.84) 
.0053 
(1.21) 
-.0133 
(-2.89) 
-.0175 
(-12.31) 
.0043 
(.97) 
Private medical 
specialist services 
.0120 
(0.77) 
-.0216 
(-6.55) 
.0336 
(2.21) 
.0120 
(0.77) 
-.0235 
(-7.32) 
.0355 
(2.32) 
Hospital specialist 
outpatient services 
-.0351 
(-2.64) 
-.0488 
(-13.02) 
.0137 
(1.08) 
-.0351 
(-2.64) 
-0494 
(-13.48) 
.0143 
(1.13) 
Note: Numbers in bold show the indices that are significant at least at 5% significant level. Numbers in bracket 
are t-statistics. 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 , 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 and 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 represent concentration index of actual use, need and horizontal inequity 
respectively. 
6.1.1 General practitioner services 
The overall concentration index 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 of the probability of GP service utilization is negative, and 
significantly different from zero at 5% significance level. It indicates that the distribution of 
the actual GP service utilization is pro-poor. In other words the lower income groups are more 
likely to visit GP than the higher income groups. The index of the need for the GP services is 
also negative and statistically significant even at more conservative level of significance. The 
implication is that lower income groups are more likely to need medical treatment than higher 
income groups. This is in line with the prediction that the lower income groups require more 
medical care than the higher income groups as they have relatively lower health status. After 
taking the need differences across groups into account in the GP service utilization, the pro-
poor inequality changes. Horizontal inequity index 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 measures the inequity that caused by 
income-related differences assuming that differences in medical care use caused by 
differences in need are fair. The horizontal inequity index of the probability of GP service use 
is positive and has an implication that GP service use is distributed pro-rich but it is not 
statistically different from zero. This can be interpreted as the utilization of GP services are 
fairly equally distributed across income groups. 
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 At this point it is important to recall that in Norway most of the GP practices have contract 
with the municipalities in which they provide their services in order to benefit from the 
National Insurance Scheme (NIS). The patients are also required to be registered with one of 
the GPs that have signed a contract with the municipality to have the expenses of medical care 
to be covered by the NIS. As the social health insurance scheme serves all residents equally, 
this equal right contributes to the fair and equitable distribution of GP services across income 
groups. The level of equity in the distribution of GP services can be interpreted more 
intuitively in the following graph. 
Figure 6.1.1 Actual and need concentration curves of the probability of GP visit, 2005 
 
The graph shows an impressive picture of the distribution of the probability of GP service 
utilization. At first glimpse one can see that both the actual use and need concentration curves 
lie above the equality line. This can be interpreted as the actual use of GP services is 
concentrated among the lower income groups. The poor are more likely to user GP services 
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intensively than the rich. The fact that the need concentration curve lies above the equality 
line shows that the lower-income groups obviously are more likely to need more GP services 
than the high-income groups. As the two curves lie close to the equality line, the income-
related inequalities in the actual use and expected need can be considered relatively low. 
However, the degrees of the inequalities are statistically significant (see table 6.1). Since the 
actual use and need concentration curves coincide, horizontal inequity is zero indicating that 
there is no income-related inequity in the distribution of the probability GP visit across 
income groups. 
The main finding concerning probability of GP services use is that both need and actual use 
are more concentrated among the lower income groups. Particularly, the significantly pro-
poor distribution of actual use of GP services is different from the findings of earlier studies 
by Van Doorslaer and Masseria et al. (2004) and Grasdal and Monstad (2008). In these 
studies they find that actual use (unstandardized) concentration index for the probability of 
GP visit is statistically insignificant though it is negative. This shows that the low income and 
higher income groups have the same probability in the use of GP services. However 
concerning horizontal equity, the finding in this paper is consistent with that of earlier studies. 
Horizontal inequality indices are positive but statistically insignificant. That is, as it is stated 
earlier the low and higher income groups face very similar probabilities of contacting a GP 
after need differences are adjusted for.   
6.1.2 Private medical specialist services 
The concentration index for the probability of actual utilization of private medical specialist 
services is positive, which signals pro-rich inequality distribution. That is, higher income 
groups are more likely to report visits to private specialists than the lower income groups. 
However, the index is not significantly different from zero indicating that actual use of private 
specialist services are fairly distributed at best. It can be seen from the need index 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁  that the 
need for specialist service is higher among the poor. When the need differences are taken into 
account, the distribution of the probability of private specialist service favors the higher 
income groups. The horizontal inequity index is positive, and statistically significant. This 
result is consistent with previous inequity findings in the distribution of private specialist 
services (Van Doorslaer, Masseria et al. 2004; Grasdal and Monstad 2008; Iversen and 
Kopperud, 2005) as it is discussed in section 2.3.  
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Figure 6.1.2 Actual and need concentration curves of the probability of private specialist 
visit, 2005 
 
Figure 6.1.2 shows that the actual use concentration curve of the probability of private 
specialist services crosses the equality line. This creates a difficulty to determine, graphically, 
whether the actual use of private specialist service is concentrated in lower or higher income 
groups. The concentration curve of the need for the private specialist service lies above the 
equality line in most parts. It indicates that the lower income groups are more likely to need 
private specialist service than the higher income groups. As it is mentioned in section 3.1, 
when the need concentration curve lies above the actual use concentration curve, the higher 
income groups receive a higher share of medical care than the share they need. As a result the 
poor is left with less use of actual care than the share they need. Thus, in this situation the 
distribution favors the rich. The fact that, need concentration curve lies above actual use 
concentration curve in figure 6.1.2 indicates that there is horizontal inequity favoring the rich. 
The area between the two curves represent horizontal inequity index which is the measure of 
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inequity. According to equation (3) the area between the two curves provides positive 
horizontal inequity index. This is consistent with the positive value of HI. 
6.1.3 Hospital specialist outpatient services 
In Norway almost all hospitals are owned by the state and the services provided are free of 
charge for inpatient services and very small copayment for outpatient services. The 
concentration index for actual hospital specialist outpatient services use indicates pro-poor 
distribution. Unlike for private medical specialist services, the low-income groups are more 
likely to visit specialists in public hospitals than the higher income groups. The need 
concentration index 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁  also indicates that the need for specialist services in the public 
hospitals is higher among lower income groups. When the need differences are controlled for, 
the resulting horizontal index indicates a pro-rich distribution of the specialist services. 
However, the index is not statistically different from zero. This shows, like in the case of GP 
services that of specialist services in the public hospitals are distributed fairly across income 
groups. 
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Figure 6.1.3 Actual and need concentration curves of the probability of hospital 
specialist outpatient visit, 2005 
 
The concentration curves of actual use of hospital specialist outpatient and need for the 
hospital specialist outpatient services are easier to interpret than that of private specialist 
services.  The actual concentration curve lies above the equality line implying that the actual 
use of specialist services in public hospitals are more concentrated among the lower income 
groups. The need concentration curve shows that the need for the specialist services in the 
public hospitals is also concentrated among the lower income groups. As the two curves 
coincide it can easily be seen that the medical services in this sector appear to be distributed 
fairly equitably across the income groups. 
 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
cu
m
ula
tiv
e 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 M
.C
ar
e 
us
e
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
cumulative proportion of pop. ranked by income
expected actual line of equality
33 
 
6.2 Decomposing concentration index  
The previous section showed the overall estimated gradient of distribution in the three types 
of medical care, with respect to income distribution, using the concentration indices. The 
indices are only general indications. It is possible to identify the major sources of inequalities 
in the utilization of the medical care using the decomposition method expressed in (11). It is 
mentioned earlier that the decomposition presupposes a linear regression model. It is known 
that medical care utilization data are better estimated using nonlinear regression models. 
Since the estimated horizontal inequity indices are similar in the two model specifications, the 
decomposition here is conducted using linear regression model (see table 6.1). The empirical 
results of the decomposition based on OLS regression are presented in tables 6.2.1-3.  
It is worth to present the common features of the detailed decomposition tables. In the 
decomposition tables the components that make up the overall concentration index (measure 
of inequality) are indicated in the columns in a way that they can express equation (11). The 
inequality due to the residual can be obtained by subtracting the sum of the contributions of 
all factors listed in each table from the total inequality or using equation (12) divided by the 
mean of medical care use.  
According to the tables the means show the proportion that the factors have in the sample 
population except income and number of chronic diseases. For these factors the means just 
show their average figures. The third column presents the coefficients from the linear 
regression of medical care on the determinant factors. They measure marginal effects of a 
small change in the determinant factors on the probability of respective medical care use for 
continuous explanatory variables (income and number of chronic diseases). For the dummy 
explanatory variables the coefficients represent the effects of the dummies, with reference to 
omitted dummy, on the probability of medical care use. Positive signs of coefficients on 
continuous variables indicate that increase in the factors increase the probability of utilization 
of the medical care while the negative sign shows the opposite. The positive sign of the 
coefficients on the dummy variables indicate the effect is higher than that of the omitted 
reference dummy while the negative sign indicates the effect is lower than that of the 
reference dummy all other things being equal. The partial elasticity in the fifth column shows 
a percentage change of medical care utilization due to a percentage change in each 
determinant factor. The partial concentration indices of the factors in the sixth column 
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indicate how a particular factor or dummy is distributed across income. The sign of the partial 
concentration index indicates whether that particular factor (dummy) is concentrated among 
higher or lower income groups. For instance the partial concentration index of the variable 
measuring number of chronic disease is negative and implies that individuals with chronic 
diseases are concentrated in the lower income groups. As it is expressed in equation (11) the 
product of the partial elasticity and the partial concentration index of a factor produce the 
partial inequality contribution to overall income-related inequality shown in seventh column. 
The negative sign of the contribution indicates that the contribution is to increase the pro-poor 
income-related inequality or to decrease the pro-rich inequality in the utilization of medical 
care. 
From the tables of decomposition we can see that the inequality index of each type of medical 
care has different major factor contributors. In the following sections the contributing factors 
to the overall inequality are discussed separately by type of medical care. To understand how 
the decomposition works and the role of each factor’s contribution to the overall inequality, 
decomposition in the GP visit concentration index is discussed in detail. Only major results 
unique to the other types of medical care are discussed to avoid redundancy. 
6.2.1 General practitioner services 
In section 6.1.1 it is shown that the concentration index for actual GP service utilization is 
negative and it indicates pro-poor inequality. When the index is decomposed into the 
contributing factors, as shown in table 6.2.1, it appears that most pro-poor inequalities are 
caused by the need variables.  
Among the need variables, dummies of self assessed health (SAH) and chronic disease, and 
number of chronic diseases are major causes of the pro-poor inequality. The positive 
coefficients on the SAH variables show that those individuals who report poor or very poor 
health are more likely to visit GP than individuals who report fair and good or very good 
health (omitted dummy). Similarly, those individuals who report severe effect of chronic 
diseases on their daily activities are more likely to visit GP than those report some or little, no 
effect and with no chronic diseases (omitted dummy). The negative partial concentration 
indices of these dummies indicate that health status lower than good or very good and the 
prevalence of chronic disease effects are concentrated among the lower income groups. These 
factors contribute negatively, and increase the pro-poor inequality in the GP visit. 
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Table 6.2.1 decomposition of inequality in GP visit, 2005 (based on linear model) 
 
 
 
variable 
Mean, 
𝒙𝒙�k 
Margin
al 
effect,  
βk 
t-
value 
Elasticit
y 
𝜷𝜷𝒌𝒌𝒙𝒙�𝒌𝒌
𝒎𝒎�
 
Partial 
Conc. 
 Index, 𝑪𝑪𝒌𝒌 
Contri- 
bution 
𝜷𝜷𝒌𝒌𝒙𝒙�𝒌𝒌
𝒎𝒎�
𝑪𝑪𝒌𝒌 
%  
contr. 
Log of equivalent income 12.41 0.000 -0.05 -0.008 0.02 -0.0002 0.01 
Self assessed health- fair 0.13 0.085 4.78 0.015 -0.13 -0.0020 0.15 
Self assessed health- poor or v. poor 0.06 0.107 3.82 0.009 -0.25 -0.0023 0.17 
Chronic affects daily activ. severely 0.11 0.197 7.96 0.030 -0.17 -0.0052 0.39 
Chronic affects daily activ. Some or little 0.37 0.168 11.33 0.090 -0.04 -0.0033 0.25 
 Chronic does not affect 0.10 0.132 6.58 0.018 0.07 0.0012 -0.09 
Number of chronic diseases 1.36 0.019 4.64 0.037 -0.11 -0.0042 0.31 
Daily cigarette-smoker 0.24 0.016 1.19 0.006 -0.09 -0.0005 0.04 
rarely cigarette smoker 0.10 0.010 0.52 0.001 0.00 0.0000 0.00 
Never do physical exercise 0.16 -0.015 -0.93 -0.003 -0.15 0.0005 -0.04 
 physical exer. less than once a week 0.13 -0.021 -1.30 -0.004 -0.04 0.0001 -0.01 
Missing data on alcohol 0.29 0.002 0.11 0.001 -0.15 -0.0001 0.01 
Drink alcohol 1-3 times per month 0.38 0.010 0.48 0.005 0.00 0.0000 0.00 
Drink alcohol 1-7 times per week 0.26 0.017 0.76 0.006 0.22 0.0014 -0.10 
Male, age between 30-45 0.15 0.005 0.20 0.001 0.05 0.0001 0.00 
Male, age between 46-59 0.13 0.005 0.18 0.001 0.26 0.0002 -0.02 
Male, age above 60 0.12 0.055 1.80 0.009 -0.03 -0.0003 0.02 
Female, age between 16-29 0.11 0.132 5.71 0.020 -0.21 -0.0042 0.32 
Female, age between 30-45 0.15 0.054 2.26 0.012 -0.01 -0.0001 0.01 
Female, age between 46-59 0.12 0.099 3.68 0.017 0.24 0.0040 -0.30 
Female, age above 60 0.12 0.078 2.51 0.013 -0.22 -0.0029 0.22 
Missing data on population density 0.21 0.001 0.04 0.000 -0.06 0.0000 0.00 
Residence area, population 2000-20000 0.27 0.005 0.25 0.002 0.03 0.0001 0.00 
Residence area, pop. 20000-100000 0.19 0.011 0.48 0.003 0.04 0.0001 -0.01 
Residence area, pop. Above 100000  0.24 0.027 1.19 0.009 0.02 0.0001 -0.01 
Region2- Hedmark and Oppland 0.08 0.028 1.18 0.003 -0.05 -0.0002 0.01 
Region3- East 0.18 -0.013 -0.67 -0.003 -0.02 0.0001 0.00 
Region4- Agder and Rogaland 0.13 -0.029 -1.46 -0.005 0.06 -0.0003 0.02 
Region5- West 0.18 -0.032 -1.80 -0.008 -0.03 0.0003 -0.02 
Region6- Trondelag 0.09 -0.023 -1.08 -0.003 -0.09 0.0003 -0.02 
Region7- North 0.11 -0.018 -0.81 -0.003 -0.08 0.0002 -0.02 
Married or registered partner 0.48 0.016 1.06 0.011 0.16 0.0019 -0.14 
Widow or separated 0.15 0.026 1.29 0.005 -0.26 -0.0014 0.10 
Student or on military service 0.07 -0.021 -0.92 -0.002 -0.29 0.0006 -0.05 
retired 0.13 -0.013 -0.52 -0.002 -0.33 0.0008 -0.06 
unemployed 0.12 -0.011 -0.60 -0.002 -0.21 0.0004 -0.03 
Have 1-7 or 8-10 years education  0.28 -0.017 -0.37 -0.007 -0.19 0.0013 -0.10 
Have 11-14 years education  0.43 0.001 0.03 0.001 0.00 0.0000 0.00 
College and above, 14 + years edu. 0.27 -0.023 -0.49 -0.009 0.22 -0.0019 0.15 
Born in Europe 0.04 0.027 0.92 0.001 -0.02 0.0000 0.00 
Born outside Europe 0.03 -0.062 -1.96 -0.003 -0.26 0.0008 -0.06 
Note: numbers in bold show the coefficient is significant at least at 5% level of significance while numbers in 
shadow show considerable contributions to the overall inequality. But one does not necessarily follow the other. 
Inequality due to need factors, CN = -.0175 
Inequality due to non-need factors = .0028 
Horizontal inequality index, HI = .0043 
Inequality due to residual, GCε/ 𝑚𝑚�  = .0014 
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Lifestyle variables have no uniform contributions to the overall inequalities since they have 
different patterns of elasticity and partial concentration indices. Smoking dummies have 
positive elasticity and negative partial concentration indices resulting in negative contribution 
which increase pro-poor GP visit. Physical training dummies have negative elasticity and 
negative partial inequality contributions resulting in positive contributions which decrease 
pro-poor inequality in GP visit. Alcohol drinking is concentrated in higher income groups in 
most cases showing positive contributions to decrease the pro-poor overall inequality index. 
Generally, the contributions of lifestyle variables to the overall inequality are very low. Most 
of the contributions are below 5% except the dummy that represents drinking alcohol 1-7 
times a week (more_ drink).   
Among the age-sex dummies, the partial concentration indices of being female aged 16-29 
and female aged above 60 are negative. Individuals in these groups are represented among the 
lower income groups. These dummies contribute considerably to the overall pro-poor 
inequalities in the probability of GP visit. On the other hand the dummy for being female 
aged 46-59 contributes considerably to decreases pro-poor inequality in the probability of GP 
visit. 
The partial concentration indices of population density dummies indicate that relatively 
densely populated areas are represented by higher income groups. As a result the contribution 
indices are positive and reduce the pro-poor inequality. However, the total contribution of 
population density variables to the overall inequality is very low. Like population density 
variables, regional variation variables contribute very little to the overall inequality. This 
implies that there is no significant regional variation as far as GP service utilization is 
concerned. 
The contribution of income itself to the overall income-related inequality in the probability of 
GP visit is very low. Education also shows the same pattern as income concerning the 
probability of GP visit; the total percentage contribution of education dummies to the overall 
inequality is also very low. Income and education shows the opposite patterns in the private 
specialist visit discussed in the next subsection. 
Other non-need variables such as marital status, occupation and place of birth also contribute 
little to overall inequality. However a dummy for being married contribute considerable 
positive inequality that decrease the overall pro-rich inequality while a dummy for being 
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widowed/separated does the opposite. Married individuals are represented among higher 
income groups while widowed/separated groups are represented among lower income groups 
i.e. the partial concentration index is positive for married and negative for widowed/separated.   
6.2.2 Private medical specialist services 
The overall income-related inequality measure of the probability of private specialist visit 
shows a pro-rich inequality though it is not statistically significant, see table 6.1. The pro-rich 
tendency is witnessed by the fact that the largest contribution to pro-rich inequality comes 
from income (table 6.2.2). Following income, a dummy for education level college and above 
(coll_ edu) contributes a considerable amount to the pro-rich inequality. Higher level education 
has a close relationship with income that highly educated people have higher income and have 
higher probability to use private specialist services. The substantial influence of education and 
income on the probability of private specialist visit cause horizontal inequity. Dummies for 
being a woman aged 46-59 and being a married or registered partner are also major 
contributors to the pro-rich inequality. The partial concentration indices of these variables 
indicate these individuals in these groups are represented among the better-off.    
On the other hand, explanatory variables that measure the number of chronic diseases, and 
dummies for self assessed health, effect of chronic disease on daily activities, being a woman 
aged above 60, being retired and having education level below 10 years of education 
contribute considerably large negative inequities. The negative contribution of these variables 
reduces the pro-rich inequalities in the probability of private specialist visit.  
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Table 6.2.2 decomposition of inequality in private specialist visit, 2005 (based on linear 
model) 
 
 
 
variable 
Mean, 
𝒙𝒙�k 
Margin
al 
effect,  
βk 
t-
value 
Elasticity 
𝜷𝜷𝒌𝒌𝒙𝒙�𝒌𝒌
𝒎𝒎�
 
Partial 
Conc. 
Index, 
𝑪𝑪𝒌𝒌 
Contri-
bution  
𝜷𝜷𝒌𝒌𝒙𝒙�𝒌𝒌
𝒎𝒎�
𝑪𝑪𝒌𝒌 
%   
contri- 
bution 
Log of equivalent income 12.41 0.014 1.69 1.030 0.02 0.0234 1.95 
Self assessed health- fair 0.13 0.068 4.55 0.051 -0.13 -0.0068 -0.56 
Self assessed health- poor or v. poor 0.06 0.056 2.36 0.019 -0.25 -0.0048 -0.40 
Chronic affects daily activ. severely 0.11 0.055 2.61 0.034 -0.17 -0.0059 -0.49 
Chronic affects daily activ. some or little 0.37 0.048 3.85 0.106 -0.04 -0.0039 -0.33 
 Chronic does not affect 0.10 0.020 1.16 0.011 0.07 0.0007 0.06 
Number of chronic diseases 1.36 0.019 5.52 0.152 -0.11 -0.0172 -1.43 
Daily cigarette-smoker 0.24 -0.007 -0.63 -0.010 -0.09 0.0009 0.08 
rarely cigarette smoker 0.10 0.020 1.25 0.011 0.00 0.0000 0.00 
Never do physical exercise 0.16 -0.015 -1.16 -0.014 -0.15 0.0021 0.17 
 physical exer. less than once a week 0.13 -0.020 -1.48 -0.016 -0.04 0.0006 0.05 
Missing data on alcohol 0.29 -0.047 -2.58 -0.079 -0.15 0.0123 1.02 
Drink alcohol 1-3 times per month 0.38 -0.017 -0.97 -0.039 0.00 -0.0001 -0.01 
Drink alcohol 1-7 times per week 0.26 0.003 0.14 0.004 0.22 0.0009 0.08 
Male, age between 30-45 0.15 0.011 0.55 0.009 0.05 0.0005 0.04 
Male, age between 46-59 0.13 0.001 0.03 0.001 0.26 0.0001 0.01 
Male, age above 60 0.12 0.029 1.12 0.020 -0.03 -0.0006 -0.05 
Female, age between 16-29 0.11 0.015 0.76 0.009 -0.21 -0.0019 -0.16 
Female, age between 30-45 0.15 0.036 1.78 0.032 -0.01 -0.0002 -0.02 
Female, age between 46-59 0.12 0.044 1.95 0.031 0.24 0.0073 0.61 
Female, age above 60 0.12 0.050 1.90 0.035 -0.22 -0.0076 -0.63 
Missing data on population of the area 0.21 -0.036 -1.96 -0.044 -0.06 0.0028 0.23 
Residence area, population 2000-20000 0.27 -0.008 -0.47 -0.013 0.03 -0.0004 -0.03 
Residence area, pop. 20000-100000 0.19 -0.017 -0.91 -0.020 0.04 -0.0007 -0.06 
Residence area, pop. Above 100000  0.24 -0.001 -0.03 -0.001 0.02 0.0000 0.00 
Region2- Hedmark and Oppland 0.08 0.009 0.43 0.004 -0.05 -0.0002 -0.02 
Region3- East 0.18 -0.013 -0.80 -0.014 -0.02 0.0002 0.02 
Region4- Agder and Rogaland 0.13 -0.048 -2.89 -0.038 0.06 -0.0021 -0.18 
Region5- West 0.18 -0.009 -0.60 -0.010 -0.03 0.0003 0.02 
Region6- Trondelag 0.09 -0.067 -3.69 -0.036 -0.09 0.0031 0.26 
Region7- North 0.11 -0.074 -4.03 -0.046 -0.08 0.0039 0.33 
Married or registered partner 0.48 0.008 0.58 0.022 0.16 0.0035 0.30 
Widow or separated 0.15 0.013 0.75 0.011 -0.26 -0.0028 -0.23 
Student or on military service 0.07 0.014 0.74 0.006 -0.29 -0.0018 -0.15 
retired 0.13 0.013 0.64 0.010 -0.33 -0.0034 -0.28 
unemployed 0.12 0.006 0.39 0.004 -0.21 -0.0009 -0.08 
Have 1-7 or 8-10 years education  0.28 0.038 0.96 0.061 -0.19 -0.0116 -0.97 
Have 11-14 years education  0.43 0.048 1.23 0.121 0.00 -0.0003 -0.03 
College and above, 14 + years edu. 0.27 0.050 1.28 0.081 0.22 0.0175 1.46 
Born in Europe 0.04 -0.010 -0.39 -0.002 -0.02 0.0000 0.00 
Born outside Europe 0.03 -0.016 -0.59 -0.003 -0.26 0.0008 0.07 
Note: numbers in bold show the coefficient is significant at least at 5% level of significance while numbers in 
shadow show considerable contributions to the overall inequality. But one does not necessarily follow the other. 
Inequality due to need factors, CN = -.0235 
Inequality due to non-need factors = .0312 
Horizontal inequality index, HI = .0355 
Inequality due to residual, GCε/𝑚𝑚�   = .0043 
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In Van Doorslaer and Masseria et al. (2004) it is indicated that in Norway there prevailed 
regional variations in the use of specialist services for year 2000 data. There is still regional 
variations in the private specialist service use as it can be seen in table 6.2.2 in the current 
study. The coefficients on the regional variation dummies indicate most of the regions have 
lower probabilities in the private specialist visit compared to relatively densely populated 
region, Oslo and the surroundings (omitted dummy). Individuals living in urban areas are 
more likely to have higher income and education than the individuals in rural areas and more 
likely to visit private specialists. In addition private specialist services are concentrated in 
urban areas. This also contributes to the regional variation in the private specialist service use. 
The total contribution of regional variation to overall inequality indicates a substantial pro-
rich inequality as there may be variation in income between the regions. It can also be seen 
that regional variation dummies contribute larger inequalities in private specialist use 
compared to the other types of medical care use. 
6.2.3 Hospital specialist outpatient services 
Table 6.2.3 shows that the inequality contributions of the determinant factors in the overall 
income-related inequality of the probability of hospital specialist visit have similar pattern as 
that of the probability of GP visit. The largest percentage of the pro-poor inequality in the 
probability of hospital specialist visit is caused by need factors. The percentage inequality 
contributed by income itself to the total income-related inequality is very small compared to 
the percentage contribution of inequality in income in the probability of private specialist 
visit. The total contribution of education is also relatively low but a dummy having higher 
education level (coll_ edu) contributes relatively larger percentage to pro-rich inequality. Some 
explanatory variables like dummies for being married, and being female aged 46-59 have 
positive partial contribution indices that reduce the pro-poor overall inequality. Like in the 
probability of GP visit the contribution of regional variation dummies are low.  
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Table 6.2.3 decomposition of inequality in hospital specialist outpatient visit, 2005 (based 
on linear model) 
 
 
 
variable 
Mean, 
𝒙𝒙�k 
Margin
al 
effect, 
 βk 
t-
value 
Elasticity 
𝜷𝜷𝒌𝒌𝒙𝒙�𝒌𝒌
𝒎𝒎�
 
Partial  
Conc.  
Index, 
𝑪𝑪𝒌𝒌 
Contri- 
bution 
𝜷𝜷𝒌𝒌𝒙𝒙�𝒌𝒌
𝒎𝒎�
𝑪𝑪𝒌𝒌 
% 
Contri 
bution 
Log of equivalent income 12.41 0.002 0.18 0.093 0.02 0.0021 -0.06 
Self assessed health- fair 0.13 0.107 6.59 0.062 -0.13 -0.0082 0.23 
Self assessed health- poor or v. poor 0.06 0.188 7.32 0.050 -0.25 -0.0126 0.36 
Chronic affects daily activ. severely 0.11 0.151 6.71 0.074 -0.17 -0.0127 0.36 
Chronic affects daily activ. some or little 0.37 0.080 5.91 0.136 -0.04 -0.0050 0.14 
 Chronic does not affect 0.10 0.030 1.64 0.013 0.07 0.0009 -0.02 
Number of chronic diseases 1.36 0.015 3.98 0.092 -0.11 -0.0104 0.30 
Daily cigarette-smoker 0.24 0.012 0.95 0.013 -0.09 -0.0011 0.03 
rarely cigarette smoker 0.10 0.006 0.34 0.003 0.00 0.0000 0.00 
Never do physical exercise 0.16 -0.026 -1.84 -0.019 -0.15 0.0028 -0.08 
 physical exer. less than once a week 0.13 -0.036 -2.48 -0.022 -0.04 0.0008 -0.02 
Missing data on alcohol 0.29 0.015 0.77 0.020 -0.15 -0.0031 0.09 
Drink alcohol 1-3 times per month 0.38 0.011 0.54 0.018 0.00 0.0000 0.00 
Drink alcohol 1-7 times per week 0.26 0.015 0.71 0.017 0.22 0.0037 -0.11 
Male. age between 30-45 0.15 0.004 0.17 0.002 0.05 0.0001 0.00 
Male, age between 46-59 0.13 0.005 0.20 0.003 0.26 0.0007 -0.02 
Male, age above 60 0.12 0.013 0.47 0.007 -0.03 -0.0002 0.01 
Female, age between 16-29 0.11 0.027 1.26 0.013 -0.21 -0.0027 0.08 
Female, age between 30-45 0.15 0.035 1.61 0.025 -0.01 -0.0001 0.00 
Female, age between 46-59 0.12 0.037 1.50 0.020 0.24 0.0047 -0.13 
Female, age above 60 0.12 0.060 2.12 0.032 -0.22 -0.0071 0.20 
Missing data on population of the area 0.21 0.011 0.55 0.010 -0.06 -0.0006 0.02 
Residence area, population 2000-20000 0.27 0.006 0.34 0.008 0.03 0.0002 -0.01 
Residence area, pop. 20000-100000 0.19 -0.005 -0.26 -0.005 0.04 -0.0002 0.00 
Residence area, pop. Above 100000  0.24 -0.010 -0.48 -0.011 0.02 -0.0002 0.00 
Region2- Hedmark and Oppland 0.08 0.082 3.85 0.032 -0.05 -0.0016 0.05 
Region3- East 0.18 0.019 1.07 0.016 -0.02 -0.0003 0.01 
Region4- Agder and Rogaland 0.13 -0.013 -0.73 -0.008 0.06 -0.0004 0.01 
Region5- West 0.18 0.043 2.61 0.035 -0.03 -0.0011 0.03 
Region6- Trondelag 0.09 0.028 1.43 0.012 -0.09 -0.0010 0.03 
Region7- North 0.11 0.036 1.80 0.017 -0.08 -0.0015 0.04 
Married or registered partner 0.48 0.026 1.85 0.057 0.16 0.0094 -0.27 
Widow or separated 0.15 0.024 1.29 0.016 -0.26 -0.0040 0.11 
Student or on military service 0.07 -0.016 -0.76 -0.005 -0.29 0.0015 -0.04 
retired 0.13 0.004 0.20 0.003 -0.33 -0.0009 0.02 
unemployed 0.12 0.018 1.05 0.010 -0.21 -0.0021 0.06 
Have 1-7 or 8-10 years education  0.28 0.008 0.19 0.010 -0.19 -0.0020 0.06 
Have 11-14 years education  0.43 0.034 0.82 0.068 0.00 -0.0002 0.01 
College and above, 14 + years edu. 0.27 0.038 0.90 0.047 0.22 0.0102 -0.29 
Born in Europe 0.04 0.067 2.48 0.011 -0.02 -0.0002 0.01 
Born outside Europe 0.03 0.041 1.43 0.006 -0.26 -0.0017 0.05 
Note: numbers in bold show the coefficient is significant at least at 5% level of significance while numbers in 
shadow show considerable contributions to the overall inequality. But one does not necessarily follow the other. 
Inequality due to need factors, CN = -.0494 
Inequality due to non-need factors = .0057 
Horizontal inequality index, HI = .0143 
Inequality due to residual, GCε/𝑚𝑚�   = .0086 
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6.2.4 Summary of concentration indices decomposition 
 Table 6.2.4 presents a summary of the patterns in the major contributions of inequalities in 
the three medical care uses. The factors are selected on the bases of the major or the least 
contributors to overall inequality in the three types of medical care use. For instance income 
and education are the major contributors to pro-rich inequality in the private specialist service 
while they are the minor contributors to inequality in the GP service utilization. Inequality 
due to need variables is the summation of the contributions of each need-related dummies of 
SAH, effect of chronic disease, lifestyle and number of chronic disease. Inequality due to 
other non-need factors includes the contributions of all non-need factors other than income 
and education namely population density, regional variation, occupation and place of origin. 
Inequality due to the residual is the inequality that is not explained by the determinant factors. 
It is computed using equation (12). 
Table 6.2.4 Contributions of factors to inequality in the use of GP, private specialist and 
hospital specialist outpatient services (based on linear model) 
Indices General 
practitioner 
% Private 
specialist  
% Hospital 
specialist 
% 
Need, CN -.0175 132 -.0235 -195.8 -.0494 141 
Income -.0002 1.4 .0234 194.7 .0021 -6 
education -.0007 4.9 .0055 46 .0081 -23 
other non-need .0037 -27.6 .0024 19.5 -.0045 12.7 
residual .0014 -10.7 .0043 35.6 .0086 -24.7 
Total, CM -.0133 100 .0120 100 -.0351 100 
Horizontal ineq., HI .0043  .0355  .0143  
Source: extracted from decomposition tables 6.2.1 – 3 
Note: HI here is not the same to the HI from “convenient regression” in the case when need is estimated using 
logit model in table 5.1. However, HI here and that from “convenient regression” when need is estimated using 
linear regression model are equal since decomposition used the same linear model. 
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Table 6.2.4 provides a good overview of the findings in table 6.1, which asserted that there is 
no horizontal inequity in the GP and hospital specialist outpatient services utilization, and that 
there exists horizontal inequity in the use of private specialist services. In table 6.1 it is 
indicated that there is a significant overall pro-poor inequality in actual use of GP and hospital 
specialist outpatient services. But after need differences are controlled, the resulting 
horizontal inequality indices show no more significant differences in the distributions across 
income groups. The decomposition reveals that the effects of non-need factors (including 
income and education) on medical care use are insignificant and their contributions to total 
inequality are also low. This can be seen in table 6.2.4 looking at the percentage contribution 
of each summarized factors to the total inequality. The major pro-poor contributors are the 
need factors. Inequality due to the residual shows that there are other omitted factors that 
contribute positively to total inequality. These factors cause a decrease in the total degree of 
inequality in the use of GP and hospital specialist outpatient services by 10.7% and 24.7% 
respectively. 
The aggregated decomposition results for the probability of private specialist visit shows the 
opposite compared to that of the other types of medical care services. It is rather income and 
education that contribute the largest share to pro-rich total inequality. The contribution of 
need is negative in private specialist case too and decreases the pro-rich inequality.   
Table 6.2.4 helps to identify the difference between income-related inequity (HI) and the 
contribution of income itself to the inequity. HI is computed taking needs into account, i.e. 
keeping only need constant. The effect of non-need factors (including income) remain in the 
computation, see (13).  On the other hand, the inequality contribution of income itself to the 
overall income-related inequity is computed based on the marginal effect that assumes all 
other things equal. That is, it shows only the partial contribution of income. For example, in 
private specialist use income-related inequity (HI) is 0.035 and the contribution of income is 
0.023. The difference is thus due to the contributions of other non-need variables and the 
residual.   
One of the impressive results of the decomposition method is that need factors contribute to 
increase pro-poor inequality and to decrease pro-rich inequality.  As it is seen in table 6.2.4 
the largest share of pro-poor inequality in the probability of GP visit is contributed by need 
factors. In the aggregation of inequalities the contribution of need factors is balanced by the 
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pro-rich inequalities (positive indices) of other non-need factors and residual. On balance, the 
overall inequality remains significantly pro-poor in the actual use of GP services.  
The overall inequality in the probability of private specialist visit is pro-rich but statistically 
insignificant. As one can see from table 6.2.4, the largest share of inequality is caused by non-
need factors; particularly income and education. The table also indicates that there are some 
considerable pro-rich inequalities that are not explained by the determinant factors and appear 
in the residual. The negative inequality index due to need-related factors reduces the pro-rich 
inequality in the probability of private specialist service distribution. The negative 
contribution of need factors could cancel the positive contribution of income itself to the 
inequality. However due to considerably large contribution of other non-need and education, 
the HI remains statistically significant (referring table 6.1). 
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7 Conclusion  
The aim of this paper has been to examine the degree of income-related inequality and 
inequity in the utilization of medical care services, measured by physician visit, in Norway. I 
have estimated the degree of inequalities (concentration indices) in the probability of general 
practitioners, of private specialists and of hospital specialist outpatient visit. Further, I 
decomposed the degree of inequalities to identify the major factors that contribute to the 
inequality. To conduct the study, Norwegian living conditions survey data for the year 2005 is 
used.  
To measure inequality in the distribution of medical care utilization Concentration index is 
chosen as an appropriate tool because it is convenient to compute inequality and easy to 
interpret intuitively. By using the indirect standardization method need for medical care is 
estimated to measure need concentration index. A measure of the degree of horizontal 
inequity is then obtained by comparing the distribution of actual medical care use and need 
distribution.  
This paper finds that the low-income groups are more likely to use primary and public 
hospital specialist services intensively than the higher income groups. The need for these 
medical services is also higher among the lower income groups. After need differences are 
controlled for, the probability of GP and hospital specialist services appear to be distributed 
fairly across the income groups. No evidence of horizontal inequity is found in distribution of 
these services. This result is consistent with those previously found by Van Doorslaer and 
Masseria et al. (2004) and Grasdal and Monstad (2008). That is, need is the driving force for 
utilization rather than income or other socioeconomic factors. However, the concentration 
indices for the probability of (actual) use in these services indicate significant pro-poor 
inequality contrary to the insignificant pro-poor inequalities in the previous studies.    
When it comes to the utilization of private specialist services, results are different. The 
distribution in the probability of actual use shows pro-rich inequality, though it is not 
statistically significant. When need differences are taken into account, the distribution of the 
probability of private specialist services favors the rich significantly. This finding is in line 
with findings of previous studies. Van Doorslaer, Masseria et al. (2004), Grasdal and Monstad 
(2008); Iversen and Kopperud (2005) found inequity in private specialist services. 
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The results from the decomposition also reveal that the most important factors that contribute 
to pro-poor inequality in the GP and hospital specialist service are need factors. The 
contributions of non-need factors, including income, are very low. Conversely, the major 
factors that contribute to the pro-rich inequality in the probability of private specialist services 
are non-need factors mainly income and education. Concerning identification of the major 
factors contributing to the overall income inequality, the results in this paper are broadly 
consistent with those identified in previous studies mentioned above. Generally, the 
distribution of GP and public hospital services are more related to need factors while that of 
private specialist services are more related to income and education.  
This study finds no evidence that the equity principle is violated in the hospital specialist and 
GP service utilization. However the distribution of private specialist services favors the well-
off. The fact that the lower income groups have higher need for medical care, and are more 
intensive users of hospital specialist and GP services suggest inequity in health in the society. 
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